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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHAWN C. MCGUIRE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030418-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Shawn C. McGuire ("Appellant" or "McGuire") appeals 
from a conviction for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree felony. 
R. 39-40. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2002) 
which creates jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over cases transferred by the Utah 
Supreme Court. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Issue #1. Although the prosecutor and presentence investigation report ("PSI") 
recommended probation, the trial judge sentenced McGuire to prison. Within ten days of 
judgment, McGuire filed a "Motion to Reconsider Sentence." Does a trial court have 
jurisdiction over a "motion to reconsider sentence" filed within ten days of judgment? 
Preservation. McGuire preserved this issue by filing a motion to reconsider 
sentence within ten days of sentencing and arguing that the trial court had jurisdiction to 
reconsider his sentence. R. 41-42, 52-54, 94. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves the construction of the Rules of Civil 
and Criminal Procedure and therefore presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Schofield. 2002 UT 132, ^ [6, 63 P.3d 667 (reviewing statutes 
delineating district and juvenile court jurisdiction as a question of law). 
Issue #2. The prosecutor recommended probation as part of the plea bargain and 
the PSI recommended probation based on, among other things, McGuire's minimal 
criminal history, remorse, and cooperation with authorities. The trial court sent McGuire 
to prison because the nature of McGuire's crime puts society at risk. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in failing to personalize the sentence and by instead sentencing 
McGuire to prison based solely on the nature of the crime charged? 
Preservation. This issue was preserved. R. 82:3-4. 
Standard of review. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Helms. 2002 UT 12, f 8, 40 P.3d 626. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND STATUTES 
The texts of the following court rules are in Addendum B: 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated May 7, 2002, the state charged Appellant/Defendant 
Shawn C. McGuire with "Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment," 
enhanced to a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or 
(b); Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii); and "Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment," a second degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b). R. 05-07. 
On June 24, 2002, McGuire pled guilty to Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory 
with one enhancement, a first degree felony. R. 23-30. As part of that plea bargain, the 
state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and enhancements and recommend 
probation. R. 23. The PSI likewise recommended probation. PSI. 
Third District Judge Paul G. Maughan sentenced McGuire to prison on 
August 12, 2002. R. 39. The judgment was signed on August 13, 2003. R. 40. On that 
same day, August 13, 2002, McGuire filed a motion to reconsider sentence. R. 41-42. 
Thereafter, the parties briefed the issue of whether the judge had jurisdiction to 
reconsider the sentence and a hearing was held on the motion to reconsider sentence on 
November 4, 2002. R. 41-2, 52-4, 63-7, 79. The trial court denied the motion on 
April 1, 2003, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion to 
reconsider sentence filed within ten days after judgment was entered. R. 69-71. 
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McGuire filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2003. R. 72-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After McGuire pled guilty to a first degree felony Operation of a Clandestine 
Laboratory, Adult Probation and Parole (f,AP&Pn) prepared a PSI. The PSI 
recommended that the prison sentence be suspended and that McGuire be placed on 
probation, with conditions that included serving one year in jail and completing 
substance abuse and parenting treatment and counseling. R. 84. This recommendation 
was based on McGuire's minimal criminal history, his cooperation with authorities, and 
the facts of the crime, among other things. R. 84-89. 
According to the PSI, while McGuire's "criminal history is very minimal,1' his 
"biggest problem was alcohol until two years ago [he] went from a drug user to thinking 
that cooking methamphetamine [would solve his financial problems]." R. 85. He was 
without work and had two young sons to support. R. 88-89. McGuire was cooperative 
with authorities and the PSI investigator and recognized that he had lost everything due 
to his drug usage. R. 85. The PSI investigator noted that McGuire had been honest and 
was taking responsibility for his actions, but that if McGuire did not change his life and 
friends, "it will be a matter of time before he is sentenced to the Utah State Prison, but at 
this time, I believe that the defendant should be given the opportunity of probation to 
show that he can make those changes." R. 85. 
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The incident in this case involved detection of a methamphetamine laboratory at 
McGuire's residence. R. 86. Officers went to the residence after responding to a call by 
going to a home nearby, then being directed to McGuire's address. R. 85. Officers 
smelled a chemical smell when McGuire opened the door. R. 85. McGuire then 
consented to a search. R. 86. Officers found a laboratory in the bathroom and arrested 
McGuire and his common-law wife, Lisa Heaney, both of whom were present. R. 86. 
After being Mirandized, McGuire spoke openly with officers. R. 86. He told 
them "he was glad it was over." R. 86. "He stated that the lab was running for about two 
weeks," and told the officers where he had purchased materials. R. 86. He also told the 
officers that this was the third time he had tried to cook methamphetamine in his home, 
but that "the two prior times the product did not turn out right." R. 86. Finally, McGuire 
told officers "he was cooking methamphetamine to save his house." R. 86. 
At sentencing, defense counsel reiterated that McGuire had "made some really bad 
choices and bad decisions about how to handle a financial situation," but pointed out that 
he was extremely cooperative and remorseful, and was willing to follow terms of 
probation. R. 82:3-4. Defense counsel suggested that if the court were to give McGuire 
the recommended one year in jail, perhaps the court would consider an early release so 
that McGuire could complete an in-patient drug treatment program. R. 82:4. As part of 
the plea bargain, the state agreed to recommend probation. R. 23. At sentencing, the 
state "agree[d] with the year in jail with no credit for good time." R. 82:5. The 
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prosecutor, who was standing in for the prosecutor assigned to the case, then added, 
without elaboration, that the prosecutor assigned to the case "feels that the defendant is 
fortunate it's not a prison recommendation." R. 82:5. 
The trial judge refused to follow the probation recommendation. R. 82:5. The 
judge's reason for refusing to follow the recommendation was the nature of the crime. 
R. 82:5. According to the judge, prison was warranted because McGuire had cooked 
methamphetamine and that crime causes risk to the community. R. 82:5. The judge 
stated: 
. . . this is the third time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time 
complying. In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your personal 
use and your involvement in the operation of a lab, and that's it's very 
concerning to the rest of the community and the rest of this society. And I 
believe it's a plague on our community. 
Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to cook this kind 
of material, methamphetamine, it affects children's lives. It affects your 
life. It puts at risk your life or anybody involved in the process, those 
around you. You're subject to possible exposure, fires, other 
contamination. 
R. 82:5. Without mentioning anything else, the judge sentenced McGuire to prison 
because his crime of operating a clandestine laboratory created a risk to the community. 
R. 82:5-6; see transcript of sentencing hearing in Addendum C. 
The day after sentencing, McGuire filed a motion to reconsider sentence. R. 41. 
In that motion, McGuire indicated that he had new information from the arresting officer. 
R. 41. In addition, the motion indicates that input from the prosecutor assigned to the 
case, who was not present at sentencing, was relevant. R. 41. 
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The parties filed memoranda and the judge held a hearing on whether he had 
jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence. R. 94. The trial court ultimately ruled that it did 
not have jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence and denied the motion to reconsider 
sentence. R. 69-71. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A trial court has jurisdiction under Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
reconsider a sentence when a criminal defendant files a motion requesting 
reconsideration of sentence within ten days of judgment. The Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply in criminal cases where there is no other applicable rule or statute and application 
of the civil procedure rule does not conflict with a statute or constitutional provision. 
The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contain an applicable rule and there is no statute 
that applies or conflicts with the application of Rule 59(e). In case law, this Court has 
recognized the application of Rule 59(e) to criminal cases. And, application of 
Rule 59(e) to criminal cases promotes judicial economy, orderly procedure, efficiency, 
and fairness. The trial court in this case erred in concluding that it did not have 
jurisdiction to reconsider McGuire's sentence where McGuire filed a motion to 
reconsider sentence within ten days of judgment. 
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing McGuire to prison based solely 
on the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Due process and Rule 22(a) require 
that a sentence be personalized to a defendant. The judge in this case ignored McGuire's 
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minimal criminal history, amenability to treatment and probation, remorse, cooperation, 
and other positive attributes, and sentenced McGuire to prison based solely on the fact 
that the operation of methamphetamine laboratories is a "plague" and danger to society. 
By failing to personalize this sentence, the trial court abused its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE SENTENCE AND ALTER THE JUDGMENT 
IMPOSED IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court sentenced McGuire on August 12, 2002 and signed and entered 
judgment the next day. On August 13, 2002, McGuire filed a "Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence." R. 41. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear this motion under Rule 59(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's denial of the motion based on its 
conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction must therefore be reversed. 
While neither the Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Rules of Civil Procedure 
refer to a "motion to reconsider sentence," the caption does not control the 
characterization of a motion. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 
1064 (Utah 1991); State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Salt Lake 
City v. Guffev, 2001 UT App 17 (unpublished). Instead, courts consider the substance 
of the motion in determining whether a motion is cognizable under the Rules of Civil or 
Criminal Procedure. See Parker, 872 P.2d at 1044 ("In determining the character of a 
motion, the substance of the motion, not its caption, is controlling."). The substance of 
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McGuire's motion requesting that the trial court reconsider the sentence it had imposed 
fits squarely within post-judgment motions authorized by Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See generally Browder v. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 261 (1978) 
(recognizing that a motion for reconsideration falls under Rule 59, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to file a motion for new 
trial or to alter or amend judgment within ten days of judgment. That rule states in part: 
Rule 59. New trials; amendment of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in 
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59. 
Rule 59(e), which gives the trial court jurisdiction to alter or amend any judgment 
if a party files a motion within ten days of judgment, is applicable to criminal cases since 
there is no applicable criminal rule or statute. See. Guffey, 2001 UT App 17 (recognizing 
that Rule 59(e) applies in criminal cases and grants trial courts jurisdiction over timely 
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post-trial motions that can be characterized as motions to alter or amend judgment). In 
Guffey, the defendant filed an objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions a 
day after the order was entered. Id \2. This Court recognized that the objection 
qualified as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e), stating: 
[tjhough not captioned as such, the objection was in substance a post-
judgment motion to amend the judgment. "[A] motion filed within ten 
days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion 
under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)." DeBry v. Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Id. f3. Additionally, "this court has stated 'that regardless of its caption, "a motion filed 
within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either 
Rules 52(b) or 59(e)."'" Cameron v. State. 2002 UT App 301, %3 (unpublished) (quoting 
Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting DeBrv . 828 
P.2d at 522)). Moreover, motions for reconsideration of sentence have been tacitly 
approved in cases such as State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, ^|6, 59 P.3d 604, where 
this Court noted that the trial court had reconsidered and altered the sentence after the 
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. Id. 
Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further demonstrates that Rule 59(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies in criminal cases. Rule 81(e) dictates that the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply in circumstances "where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or 
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constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). Because there is no applicable statute 
or criminal procedure rule and application of Rule 59(e) to criminal cases does not 
conflict with statutory or constitutional requirements, Rule 81(e) mandates that 
Rule 59(e) applies in criminal cases. 
Although Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a trial judge to 
disturb a verdict and grant a motion for new trial that is filed within ten days of 
judgment, that rule does not expressly address circumstances such as those in the present 
case where the defendant has pled guilty and does not seek to disturb a verdict but 
instead is asking for reconsideration of the sentence. Rule 24 states in part: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition 
of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-
day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
Utah R. Crim P. 24. Because Rule 24 is silent as to post-judgment motions other than 
motions for new trial, it is not applicable to circumstances where a defendant seeks to 
alter or amend the judgment by reconsidering the sentence and does not conflict with the 
grant of Rule 59(e) allowing motions to alter or amend judgment. 
Moreover, no other criminal rule or statute is applicable to these circumstances or 
conflicts with the grant of Rule 59(e). The state argued below that Rule 22(e), Utah 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner to be corrected at any time, governs circumstances where the defendant 
seeks resentencing. R. 64. While Rule 22(e) does allow a trial court jurisdiction to 
correct an illegal sentence at any time, it does not apply to circumstances such as this 
where, within ten days of judgment, the defendant asks the trial court to reconsider 
sentence and alter or amend the judgment prior to its becoming final. 
A motion to alter or amend judgment affects the finality of the judgments and 
necessarily delays the finality of the original judgment. See Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT 
App 154, f l , 978 P.2d 1051 (a timely motion under Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure suspends the finality of the judgment). A motion under Rule 59(e) allows 
"'speedy disposition and finality5" (Browder, 434 U.S. 257, 271 (1978) (further citations 
omitted), providing an efficient means for a trial judge to amend a judgment without 
requiring further use of resources in a time consuming appeal. See generally Clipper 
Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau. Inc., 674 F. 2d 1252, 1260 (9 th Cir. 
1980) (citing United States v. Walker. 601 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1979)) ("Rule 59(e) 
provides an efficient mechanism by which a trial court judge can correct an otherwise 
erroneous judgment without implicating the appellate process"). 
By contrast, a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22(e) allows a 
defendant unlimited time to return to the trial court and correct a sentence that was 
imposed in an illegal manner or that was illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Rule 22(e) 
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does not suspend the finality of the judgment and does not provide a means for speedy 
resolution without invoking the appellate process. Instead, Rule 22(e) is a mechanism 
that allows a trial court to correct an illegally imposed sentence, no matter how much 
time has passed. Because Rule 22(e) does not suspend the finality of the judgment, it 
does not apply to requests to amend a criminal judgment that are made within ten days of 
sentencing; it therefore does not pre-empt the Rule 59(e)'s grant of jurisdiction to the 
trial court to alter or amend a sentence when the motion is filed within ten days. 
The state also argued below that since the Board of Pardons has authority pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1) (1999) to determine a defendant's actual release date, 
the trial court loses jurisdiction the moment judgment is entered and a motion to alter and 
amend judgment cannot be heard by the trial court. R. 66; see. Addendum D containing 
text of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1999). The fallacy of this argument is evident in the 
fact that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain motions for new trial without 
conflicting with the Board of Pardons' authority. The trial court likewise has jurisdiction 
to alter or amend judgment when a timely motion is filed without interfering with the 
Board's authority. Guffey, 2001 UT App 17. This is so because timely post-judgment 
motions under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure suspend the finality of the judgment. See Regan, 1999 UT App 154, [^4. 
Section 77-27-5(1) contains nothing that conflicts with a trial court's exercise of its 
authority to alter or correct a judgment and instead simply clarifies that the Board of 
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Pardons has the authority to set parole dates and to otherwise determine whether a 
sentence is commuted or terminated after a judgment becomes final. See. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-5 (1999). 
The state also argued below that this Court's decision in State v. Montoya. 825 
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) precludes a motion for reconsideration. R. 65. 
Montoya, however, did not involve a motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of 
judgment. Instead, Montoya involved an attempt to resentence a defendant long after the 
thirty days for filing a notice of appeal had passed. This Court's determination that the 
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resentence Montoya because the 
initial sentence was valid was based on the fact that the judgment had become final well 
before the request for resentencing and Montoya did not have a basis for resentencing 
under Rule 22(e) because the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner. 
Since a timely motion under Rule 59(e) suspends the finality of a judgment, Montoya's 
holding that the trial court could not resentence the defendant after the judgment became 
final does not resolve the issue in this case of whether a criminal defendant can file a 
motion for resentencing within ten days of judgment. 
The purpose of allowing the trial court jurisdiction over timely post-judgment 
motions is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct any errors that might exist and 
thereby "end controversies before an appeal becomes necessary . . . . " State v. Sixteen 
Thousand Dollars, 914 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah App. 1996). In addition, allowing the trial 
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court the opportunity to resolve the claim prior to appeal flrequire[s] the parties to 
crystallize the issues prior to appeal" and otherwise flserve[s] the interests of judicial 
economy and orderly procedure." LI at 1179. This purpose is served by treating 
motions for reconsideration of sentence as motions to alter or amend judgment under 
Rule 59(e) and allowing trial courts to reconsider the sentence imposed if a motion is 
filed within ten days of judgment. The trial court in this case seemed to recognize the 
fairness and efficiency in allowing a motion for reconsideration when it asked the 
prosecutor, "isn't it in everyone's best interest to be able to handle that [request for 
reconsideration] quickly and efficiently [in the trial court?]" R. 94:18. 
Allowing trial courts to reconsider sentence or otherwise alter or amend judgment 
when a defendant makes a timely motion provides an efficient means by which trial 
courts can alter their sentences without invoking the appellate process. Where 
McGuire's motion for reconsideration was timely under Rule 59(e), the trial court 
incorrectly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to reconsider McGuire's sentence. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING MCGUIRE TO PRISON. 
Despite the recommendation of both AP&P and the prosecutor and facts 
demonstrating that McGuire was a good candidate for probation, the trial judge 
sentenced McGuire to prison. R. 82:4-6. The trial court's decision to send McGuire to 
prison was based entirely on the nature of the crime and the fact that manufacturing 
methamphetamine subjects members of society to danger. R. 82:5. The judge stated: 
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- - this is the third time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time 
complying. In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your personal 
use and your involvement in the operation of a lab, and that's it's very 
concerning to the rest of the community and the rest of this society. And I 
believe it's a plague on the community. 
Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to cook this kind of 
material, methamphetamine, it affects children's lives. It affects your life. 
It puts at risk your life or anybody involved in the process, those around 
you. You're subject to possible exposure, fires, and other contamination. 
So, I'm going against the recommendation in this case, and I'm going to 
sentence you to five years to life in the state penitentiary. And I'm not 
trying to send that message to anybody, I'm just telling you my opinion. 
Methamphetamine labs are something that will not be tolerated. 
R. 82:5-6. The trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing by failing to personalize 
the sentence and by instead sending McGuire to prison based solely on the fact that he 
was convicted of operating a methamphetamine laboratory.1 
Although "[t]he decision whether to grant probation is within the complete 
discretion of the trial court," sentencing decisions are overturned when a trial court 
nexceed[s] the bounds of discretion." (State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other things, 
'"it fails to consider all legally relevant factors."'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tf8, 40 
1
 This Court has jurisdiction to consider this issue pursuant to Rule 4(b), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to that rule, the time for filing a notice of appeal 
from the judgment is suspended until after the trial court rules on a timely motion under 
Rule 59(e). In this case, McGuire filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of the 
denial of his motion for reconsideration. Assuming that motion is characterized as a 
Rule 59(e) motion, as argued in Point I of this brief, McGuire's notice of appeal 
encompassed the ruling on the motion for reconsideration as well as the judgment itself. 
16 
P.3d 626 (quoting State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 12345 1235 (Utah 1990) (further citations 
omitted)). MA sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light 
of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system.11 State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980). A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when it "focusfes] on the nature 
of the crime to the exclusion of any other factor relevant to sentencing." Commonwealth 
v. Plasterer, 529 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
Due process and Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure implicitly require 
that a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant be personalized. Rule 22(a) mandates 
that trial courts afford both the defendant and the prosecutor the opportunity to present 
information relevant to sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); see. also State v. Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46,1fi[18-23, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. Due process requires that a sentence be 
based on reliable and relevant information. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[18-23; State v. 
Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 
1993) {superceded by statute on other grounds, State v. Trvba. 2000 UT App 230). 
Moreover, due process requires that a presentence investigation report be disclosed to a 
defendant prior to sentencing. State v. Cesarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982). 
Implicit in these due process and Rule 22(a) requirements is the recognition that 
information other than the nature of the charge is pertinent to sentencing since the due 
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process and Rule 22(a) requirements would be meaningless and unnecessary if a judge 
could impose sentence based solely on the nature of the charge. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence based solely 
on the fact that McGuire was convicted of operating a methamphetamine laboratory and 
had acknowledged that he attempted to cook methamphetamine in that lab three times. 
R. 82:5-6. The judge's statement clearly indicates that his concern was that the 
manufacturing of methamphetamine puts the community at risk by subjecting others to 
the possibility of contamination and exposure and that methamphetamine labs are ,fa 
plague to the community." R. 82:5-6. Rather than personalizing the sentence by 
considering McGuire's amenability to treatment and probation, desire to change, minimal 
criminal record, and other factors that led the state to agree to recommend probation and 
caused the AP&P agent to recommend probation, the judge focused solely on the danger 
caused by methamphetamine manufacturing. The sentencing in this case could apply to 
any defendant convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory, with the only alteration 
being how many times the defendant admitted to trying to cook methamphetamine. 
While "'the trial court's silence, by itself, [does not] presuppose[] that the court 
did not consider the proper factors as required by law"1 (State v. Wright, 2003 UT App 
435 (unpublished) (quoting Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tfl 1)), the trial judge's statements in this 
case indicate that he did not consider the proper factors and instead imposed prison based 
solely on one factor-the nature of the crime. This case is unlike Wright and Helms 
18 
where the trial court's failure to expressly acknowledge various mitigating factors did not 
require resentencing because it could not be assumed that the judge did not consider 
those factors. See Wright, 2003 UT App 435, ffi[5-6. By contrast, in this case the judge 
expressly stated that he was going against the recommendation for probation and 
imposing prison because McGuire was convicted of operating a methamphetamine 
laboratory and methamphetamine laboratories are dangerous and a plague on society. 
Given the judge's statement, it is not reasonable to assume that he considered all of the 
mitigating factors relevant to sentencing or personalized McGuire's sentence, as required 
by Rule 22(a) and due process. 
The specifics of this case showed that McGuire was a good candidate for 
probation. McGuire had a minimal criminal history. PSP.2. Until two years before his 
arrest, McGuire primarily used alcohol rather than drugs. PSI:2. McGuire began to 
think about cooking methamphetamine in the misguided hope that he could alleviate his 
financial problems and save his house. PSI:2. He had the lab in operation for only about 
two weeks and had tried to cook methamphetamine only three times, without much 
success. PSI:3. McGuire was remorseful and honest, recognized "that he has lost 
everything that he once had because of his drug usage," and was "glad it was over." 
PSI:2, 3. By ignoring this information and otherwise failing to personalize the sentence 
and instead sending McGuire to prison based solely on the fact that he was convicted of 
19 
operating a methamphetamine lab, the judge essentially turned this type of conviction 
into a mandatory prison conviction and abused his discretion in sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Shawn C. McGuire respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. 
SUBMITTED this xi** day of December, 2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 021906198 
Date: Aug 12, 2 002 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. To the SALT LAKE County 
Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison. 
Dated this day of QS&Z* 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds, Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits: time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in 
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceed-
ings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of 
any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply to civil 
actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such rules are 
by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board 
or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing 
from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an 
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or 
inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendants arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
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2 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in the 
3 presence and hearing of the defendant:) 
4 
5 THE COURT: This is State of Utah versus Shawn 
6 McGuire, Case 021906198. Itfs set for sentencing. 
7 Ms. Sisneros, have you reviewed the presentence report. 
8 MS. SISNEROS: Yes, I have. 
9 THE COURT: Are there any errors or ommissions, 
10 inaccuracies you want to bring to my attention? 
11 MS. SISNEROS: No. 
12 THE COURT: Do you want to address the 
13 recommendations? 
14 MS. SISNEROS: Your Honor, Mr. McGuire has received 
15 J the presentence report, has been a very cooperative client, 
16 very honest. 
17 I And, all along, with everybody, he's been very 
18 cooperative. And he!s, quite frankly, been a great client to 
19 j work with. 
20 As indicated in the presentence report, and as he 
21 told the officers, this was not something that he was intending 
22 on selling. It was just for personal use. 
23 He made some really bad choices and bad decisions 
24 about how to handle a financial situation, and hefs certainly 
25 paying the price for that now. 
1 I think all in all it is a very favorable 
2 recommendation. The one thing I would like to address, and as 
3 far as everything in here, I know that Mr. McGuire will do 
4 whatever it is that your Honor requires him to do. If that's 
5 jail time, I know that he'll do that as well. He is incredibly 
6 remorseful about whatf s happened. 
7 I would like to address the jail. He's done 97 days. 
8 We would ask you give him credit for that time. 
9 If you are going to sentence him to the year, if you 
10 I would consider releasing him once we can get him in to a 
11 program. We've already started that process of looking in to 
12 intensive — I'm thinking looking in to an intensive inpatient 
13 program. That's what we're looking at in our office. 
14 If you give him a year, if you would allow him early 
15 release to a program. 
16 Another option would be letting him out on an ankle 
17 monitor pending our ability to get him in to a program. I 
18 think that's the viable option for him. 
19 This is a difficult case in that I think Mr. McGuire 
20 has been just very cooperative. He's very mild-mannered and 
21 very concerned about what it is that he's done, and I would ask 
22 that you take that in to consideration in this sentencing. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Bernards-Goodman? 
24 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Your Honor, this is Lana 
25 Taylor's case. She's reviewed the report and strongly agrees 
1 with the year in jail with no credit for good time. She feels 
2 that the defendant is fortunate it's not a prison 
3 recommendation. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. McGuire, I have reviewed the 
5 presentence report. I find it an extremely favorable 
6 recommendation and it's one I'm not inclined to follow; though 
7 I I normally do. 
8 J In fact, I've read it more than once because of the 
9 recommendation. It's troubling in the fact that what you say 
10 is the lab was set up for personal use. 
11 But there was also continued -- this is the third 
12 time you tried to do it, and were having a hard time complying. 
13 In my opinion, there's a bigger issue besides just your 
14 personal use and your involvement in the operation of a lab, 
15 and that's it's very concerning to the rest of the community 
16 and the rest of this society. And I believe it's a plague on 
17 our community. 
18 Once we start manufacturing, once we start trying to 
19 cook this kind of material, methamphetamine, it affects 
20 children's lives. It affects your life. It puts at risk your 
21 J life or anybody involved in the process, those around you. 
22 You're subject to possible exposure, fires, other 
23 contamination. 
24 So, I'm going to go against the recommendation in 
25 this case, and I'm going to sentence you to five years to life 
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in the state penitentiary. And I'm not trying to send that 
message to anybody, I'm just telling you my opinion. 
Methamphetamine labs are something that will not be tolerated. 
Good luck. 
(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to a close.) 
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ADDENDUM D 
UTAH CODE OK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A 
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The 
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in 
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any 
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may 
designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed 
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other 
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not 
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with 
Section 76-3-201. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's 
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, 
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations 
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the 
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided 
in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders 
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have 
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
the board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to 
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and proce-
dures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of 
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall 
consider the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in 
